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NOTES
THE  COUPON  QUANDARY:  RESTRUCTURING
INCENTIVES  IN  CAFA  COUPON  SETTLEMENTS
Michael Gallagher II*
INTRODUCTION
Envision the following scenario:
In one state court class action involving faulty pipes, lawyers for a group
of Alabama plaintiffs received more than $38.4 million in fees, and lawyers
for a class of Tennessee plaintiffs received $45 million, or the equivalent of
about $2,000 an hour.  In contrast, the homeowners only received 8 percent
rebates toward new plumbing—and to get those rebates, they had to first
prove that they had suffered leaks and then go out and buy a new system.
The money in the settlement flowed primarily to class counsel.1
Consider further that “[t]o settle an Illinois state court class action in
which it was accused of improperly including asbestos in its crayons, a manu-
facturer agreed to issue class members 75-cent coupons toward the purchase
of new crayons.  The attorneys got $600,000 in fees.”2
These cases are precisely why coupon settlements in class action lawsuits
garner attention.  Essentially, members of the class receive very little while
the attorneys receive large—and, in some instances, surprisingly large—pay-
ments to settle the claims.  Generally, there is a fear that these settlements
will be the result of collusion between the defendants and class counsel.
Both have much to gain from a lucrative payout.  The class counsel will walk
away with a hefty sum, and the defendants will avoid incurring costs associ-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School 2017; Bachelor of Arts,
Duquesne University 2013.  I thank Professor Jay Tidmarsh, my Note advisor, for all of his
guidance.  I also thank my family for their unending support.  Lastly, I must thank the
editors of Volume 91 of the Notre Dame Law Review for their diligence throughout the
editing process.  All errors are my own.
1 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 19 (2005) (footnote omitted).  For a more in-depth report of
the specifics of the lawsuit, see Richard B. Schmitt, Leaky System: Suits over Plastic Pipe Finally
Bring Relief, Especially for Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1995, at A1.
2  S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 18.
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ated with litigating the case.  The fear is that the plaintiffs will be left power-
less to adequately redress their grievances.
Congress addressed these concerns by enacting the Class Action Fairness
Act (CAFA),3 which contained a section on coupon settlements.  However, as
courts have interpreted CAFA, the following question has arisen: When attor-
neys’ work results in coupons for the class, does CAFA preclude the use of
the lodestar method4 for calculating their fees?  Or, conversely, is a contin-
gency fee mandatory?
In answering this question, this Note seeks to accomplish the following
goals: (1) examine the precise question whether CAFA precludes the use of
the lodestar method to calculate attorneys’ fees in cases where the attorneys’
work resulted in coupon settlements; and (2) propose a solution that more
closely aligns the incentives of class counsel to those of the class.  Generally
speaking, Congress wrote CAFA to allow for the use of the lodestar method—
although it did so in convoluted language—yet evinced a broad legislative
intent to disallow the method.  For this reason, the case law expounding on
the provision has culminated in a circuit split.  The Ninth Circuit, in In re HP
Inkjet Printer Litigation,5 held that the statute prohibited the use of the lode-
star method when coupons were the relief obtained.6  Conversely, the Sev-
enth Circuit, in In re Southwest Airlines Voucher Litigation,7 held that district
courts have the discretion to allow either the lodestar method or a contin-
gency fee, and parties should be accorded the autonomy to negotiate any
method subject to other statutory constraints.8
This Note argues that, while the Ninth Circuit has a compelling policy
argument, the Seventh Circuit has the superior legal argument.  This is so
because § 1712(a), when interpreted along with § 1712(b) and § 1712(c),
contemplates the existence of a choice between the lodestar method and a
contingency fee.  The legislative history, although relied upon heavily by the
Ninth Circuit, also weighs in favor of the Seventh Circuit.9  The Ninth Cir-
3 Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
4 To clarify, the lodestar method of calculating attorneys’ fees is “the number of
hours reasonably expended [on the action] multiplied by the prevailing community rate.”
THOMAS E. WILLGING & NANCY A. WEEKS, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEY FEE PETITIONS 29
(1985). This was perhaps “best articulated” in the Third Circuit case, Lindy Brothers Build-
ers, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). WILLG-
ING & WEEKS, supra, at 31.
5 716 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2013).
6 Id. at 1184 (“[T]he unambiguous command of § 1712(a) requires that ‘any attor-
ney’s fee’ awarded for obtaining coupon relief be calculated using the redemption value of
the coupons.”).
7 799 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2015).
8 Id. at 707 (“[A] broader view of the text and structure of § 1712 . . . persuades us
that § 1712 allows a district court discretion to use the lodestar method to calculate attor-
ney fees even when those fees are intended to compensate class counsel for the coupon
relief he or she obtained for the class.”).
9 To be precise, “[t]he legislative history of a statute is the history of its consideration
and enactment.”  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 662 n.28 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL510.txt unknown Seq: 3 30-AUG-16 10:57
2016] the  coupon  quandary 2093
cuit’s argument cannot be immediately refuted, however, because Congress
clearly evinced an intent to alter the incentives at play in coupon settlements.
This conflict between intent and statutory language illuminates yet again how
poorly CAFA was drafted.10
This Note proceeds in five parts.  Part I provides a background of cou-
pon settlements with special attention paid to the incentives of class counsel.
Part II outlines CAFA’s relevant statutory provisions and examines them in
light of the “Purposes” section in the statute and the Senate report accompa-
nying the legislation—the most illuminating indicia of legislative intent.  Part
III examines the rationale supporting both cases in the circuit split and the
implications behind both interpretive regimes.  Part IV argues that the Sev-
enth Circuit has the better legal argument for two reasons: (1) its strong
textual argument; and (2) its support found in the Senate report.  The Sev-
enth Circuit’s reasoning makes it difficult to reconcile the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion with the text and legislative history of the statute.  Part V concludes
by arguing that coupon settlements under CAFA raise a significant issue that
should be addressed by Congress.  Congress employed strong language
throughout the Senate report indicating that it wanted to closely align the
incentives of class counsel with members of the class.  Part V continues by
suggesting a methodology for courts to follow.  This approach aims to accom-
modate both the interests of class counsel and class members to create a rea-
sonable solution.
This Note does not decide whether coupon settlements are per se desir-
able or undesirable.  There is robust scholarly literature describing the incen-
tive structures inherent in coupon settlements and the pros and cons
concerning their use.  Arguments on both sides have merit, and these argu-
ments are discussed later in the Note.11  This Note does, however, explain
dissenting) (quoting Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part)).
10 See, e.g., Sw. Airlines, 799 F.3d at 706 (“Identifying abusive coupon settlements, how-
ever, was easier than crafting legislation to prevent them.”); HP Inkjet, 716 F.3d at 1181
(“Both the majority of our panel and our dissenting colleague agree that CAFA is poorly
drafted.”); Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 680–81 (9th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (“The wording of this [CAFA] subsection is clumsy.”).  Several courts, when attack-
ing the language of CAFA, invoke the following excerpt from a law review article: “[CAFA],
after all, resulted from years of intense lobbying (on both sides of the aisle by interest
groups associated with both plaintiffs and defendants), partisan wrangling, and, following
two successful filibusters, fragile compromises.”  Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fair-
ness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1441 (2008);
see also Sw. Airlines, 799 F.3d at 706 (invoking the same portion of the article); HP Inkjet,
716 F.3d at 1181 (referencing the article).  In his article, Burbank further went on to note
the effects of this language, claiming that “some critics regard the compromises [in CAFA]
as insufficient and the ultimate legislation as inimical to the interests of numerous groups
of potential litigants.”  Burbank, supra, at 1441; see also Scott L. Nelson, CAFA in the Con-
gress: The Eight-Year Struggle, in THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT 23, 23 (Gregory C. Cook
ed., 2013) (“The enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act in February of 2005 marked
the culmination of eight years of effort by five Congresses.”).
11 See infra Section I.B.
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that the broad purpose evinced in the legislative history—attempting to avoid
situations in which attorneys act at the expense of their clients—is not sup-
ported by the statutory text.  CAFA is all bark with no proverbial bite.  This
Note provides a remedy to more closely align those incentive structures.  If
citizens truly do want to limit the availability of the lodestar method to alter
class counsel’s incentives, they should attempt to change that through their
elected representatives in Congress.
I. COUPON SETTLEMENTS
A. Mechanics of the Coupon Settlement
First, it is necessary to elaborate on the mechanics of the coupon settle-
ment process to ensure a working understanding of the material at issue.
Typically, once a class action suit is certified, settlement is the norm and trial
is the exception.12  In its simplest form, the defendant will offer the class
coupons in exchange for the class dropping all claims against the defendant.
Coupons have generally been accorded a capacious definition that allows for
more than merely a discount on a product.  For example, courts have ruled
that a voucher falls within the definition of coupon pursuant to CAFA.13
What constitutes a coupon has more to do with the “nonpecuniary” aspect of
the relief than a rigid, generally accepted definition of coupon.14
Two scholars elaborated on the intricacies of the coupon settlement pro-
cess as follows:
Generally, as part of the settlement, the defendant agrees to pay all costs of
notice and administration as well as the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.  The
defendant usually includes a cash component with the nonpecuniary settle-
ment to finance these costs and fees.  Typically, the defendant denies all
wrongdoing, and the class releases the defendant from any and all liability in
connection with the allegations in the complaint.15
B. Coupon Settlements in the Public Eye
Coupon settlements have generally been greeted with significant skepti-
cism and hostility in public discourse.16  Behind these critiques is the fear
12 See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in
Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 652 (2006)
(“Certified class actions generally produce[ ] settlements and monetary recoveries.”).
13 See, e.g., Sw. Airlines, 799 F.3d at 706 (“We have rejected a narrow definition of ‘cou-
pon’ by rejecting, for purposes of § 1712, a proposed distinction between ‘vouchers’ (good
for an entire product) and ‘coupons’ (good for price discounts).” (citing Redman v. Radi-
oShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2014))).
14 Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 98 (1997).
15 Id. at 102 (footnote omitted).
16 See, e.g., Willging & Wheatman, supra note 12, at 651 (“Courts and commentators
have criticized the use of coupons, particularly nontransferable coupons with no market
value, to settle class action lawsuits.”); Daniel Fisher, Study Shows Consumer Class-Action Law-
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that attorneys will sacrifice their clients’ interests (i.e., the best relief possible
given the factual and legal circumstances of each case) for the advancement
of their personal interests (i.e., obtaining the highest attorney fee award pos-
sible).  Presumably for this reason, one scholar opined that if the attorneys
get paid an exorbitant sum of money, “the reputation of the profession might
suffer.”17  That is precisely why—in addition to normative concerns of funda-
mental fairness—finding the optimal sum is imperative.
This criticism was not confined solely to the public arena, however.
Scholars and politicians have also argued that coupon settlements create
incentives that work to the detriment of consumers who represent the class.18
Generally, this opposition has been rather strong and even characterized as
“vociferous” in some contexts.19
On the other end of the spectrum, however, scholars posit that this criti-
cism is misguided—or at least overstated.  In response to Congress’s reliance
on anecdotal evidence to address attorneys’ fees and coupon settlements in
CAFA,20 scholars Thomas E. Willging and Shannon R. Wheatman gathered
yers Earn Millions, Clients Little, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/2013/12/11/with-consumer-class-actions-lawyers-are-mostly-paid-to-do-noth-
ing/ (“‘[C]oupon’ settlements [are] where clients win the privilege of buying discounted
products from the same companies that supposedly ripped them off, while the lawyers are
paid in cash.”); Jacob Shamsian, Opinion, A Case Against Southwest Airlines Reveals the Biggest
Problem with Consumer Lawsuits in America, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 26, 2015), http://
www.businessinsider.com/everything-wrong-with-class-action-lawsuits-in-america-2015-8
(“[C]ases where lawyers receive large cash payouts and consumers receive little to nothing
have gotten more and more criticism recently.”); Michelle Singletary, Opinion, Class-Action
Coupon Settlements Are a No-Win for Consumers, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2011), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/class-action-coupon-settlements-are-a-no-
win-for-consumers/2011/04/27/AFJITL1E_story.html (“Except in the cases where a com-
pany is forced to end bad practices, consumers don’t win in [coupon] settlements.”).
17 Developments in the Law: Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1611 (1976).
18 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 16 (2005) (noting that, for the company, coupons are
“a promotional opportunity and not a penalty”); Bruce L. Hay, The Theory of Fee Regulation
in Class Action Settlements, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (1997) (“A widely recognized risk
[of class action settlements] is that the class counsel may in effect . . . enter into a ‘collu-
sive’ settlement, thus yielding the class members an amount much smaller than the actual
value of their claims.” (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1367–75 (1995))); Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-
Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49
UCLA L. REV. 991, 994 (2002) (“Coupon-based settlements illustrate how defendants have
structured class action settlements to maximize the gains for the corporate defendant
while minimizing any compensation to the class.”). But see, e.g., Lisa M. Mezzetti &
Whitney R. Case, The Coupon Can Be the Ticket: The Use of “Coupon” and Other Non-Monetary
Redress in Class Action Settlements, 18 GEO. J.L. ETHICS 1431, 1434 (2005) (“[I]t [can be]
advantageous to both sides to include non-cash compensation in settlements.  In fact, a
good coupon may make a settlement more attractive than pure cash to class members.”
(footnote omitted)).
19 Mezzetti & Case, supra note 18, at 1431.
20 See infra Section II.B.
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empirical evidence concerning the class action legal landscape.21  Their find-
ings showed that most class action lawsuits did not even survive the certifica-
tion stage of the class action process.22  Typically, in lawsuits that did settle,
members of the class received monetary sums.23  Only nine percent of the
cases in the survey featured a coupon settlement—either transferable or
nontransferable.24
This evidence supports the notion that coupon settlements are not as
prevalent as legal lore might suggest.  After all, anecdotal evidence that
incites indignation because of seemingly unfair outcomes does not address
how frequently an injury occurs.  Each injustice is presented on a case-by-case
basis.25  While there are compelling arguments concerning the prevalence
and significance of coupon settlements in practice, the fact of the matter is
that Congress responded.
II. CAFA STATUTORY SCHEME AND SENATE REPORT 109-14
A. Relevant CAFA Provisions and Purposes
Congress enacted CAFA in 2005 in part to address the aforementioned
concerns.26  Of particular relevance here are §§ 1711–12, which establish
definitions27 and govern the processes by which the court may calculate and
award attorneys’ fees.28
The statutory scheme is relatively straightforward.  Section 1712 is
divided into five sections.  The first three provisions guide courts by denoting
permissible attorneys’ fees calculations and, in certain circumstances, when
to employ them.29  Section 1712(a) provides guidance for contingent fees
(i.e., where the class counsel will recover a specified amount in proportion to
the class’s recovery);30 § 1712(b) covers “[o]ther” attorneys’ fee awards;31
and § 1712(c) governs procedures where settlement relief comes in the form
21 See generally Willging & Wheatman, supra note 12.
22 Id. at 652.
23 Id.
24 Id.  These findings are consistent with empirical evidence displayed in the Senate
report—although the Senate did not cite the name of the source. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 77
(2005) (“[S]ettlements with coupons account only for about 10 percent of all class-action
settlements.”).
25 Imagine, for example, that one thousand class action lawsuits were filed in Year A.
If you were presented with the facts of three such lawsuits that resulted in manifest injus-
tice—in this case, plaintiffs recovering virtually worthless coupons while the class counsel
receive exorbitant sums of money—you might be outraged.  Those three stories do not
convey, however, that there may have been nine hundred ninety-seven perfectly just out-
comes.  Just because something happens does not mean that it happens frequently.
26 Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
27 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2012).
28 Id. § 1712.
29 Id. §§ 1712(a)–(c).
30 Id. § 1712(a).  Due to the importance of these statutory provisions in this Note, the
relevant statutory provisions appear below.  Section 1712(a) reads as follows:
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of coupons and some form of injunctive relief.32  Section 1712(e) adds extra
strength to combat exorbitant attorneys’ fees by requiring a hearing to deter-
mine whether “the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for class
members.”33
In CAFA, then, there are two important mechanisms by which the court
can mitigate attorneys’ fees: (1) the court must approve attorneys’ fees where
(a) coupons were the relief obtained; and (b) the attorneys’ fees were calcu-
lated by using the lodestar method rather than a contingency fee;34 and
(a) Contingent Fees in Coupon Settlements.—If a proposed settlement in a class
action provides for a recovery of coupons to a class member, the portion of any
attorney’s fee award to class counsel that is attributable to the award of the cou-
pons shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that are
redeemed.
Id.
31 Id. § 1712(b).  Section 1712(b) reads:
(b) Other Attorney’s Fee Awards in Coupon Settlements.—
(1) In General.—If a proposed settlement in a class action provides for a
recovery of coupons to class members, and a portion of the recovery of the
coupons is not used to determine the attorney’s fee to be paid to class coun-
sel, any attorney’s fee award shall be based upon the amount of time class
counsel reasonably expended working on the action.
(2) Court Approval.—Any attorney’s fee under this subsection shall be sub-
ject to approval by the court and shall include an appropriate attorney’s fee,
if any, for obtaining equitable relief, including an injunction, if applicable.
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit application of a
lodestar with a multiplier method of determining attorney’s fees.
Id.
32 Id. § 1712(c).  Section 1712(c) reads:
(c) Attorney’s Fee Awards Calculated on a Mixed Basis in Coupon Settlements.—
If a proposed settlement in a class action provides for an award of coupons to
class members and also provides for equitable relief, including injunctive relief—
(1) that portion of the attorney’s fee to be paid to class counsel that is based
upon a portion of the recovery of the coupons shall be calculated in accor-
dance with subsection (a); and
(2) that portion of the attorney’s fee to be paid to class counsel that is not
based upon a portion of the recovery of the coupons shall be calculated in
accordance with subsection (b).
Id.
33 Id. § 1712(e).  Section 1712(e) provides:
(e) Judicial Scrutiny of Coupon Settlements.—In a proposed settlement under
which class members would be awarded coupons, the court may approve the pro-
posed settlement only after a hearing to determine whether, and making a writ-
ten finding that, the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for class
members.  The court, in its discretion, may also require that a proposed settle-
ment agreement provide for the distribution of a portion of the value of
unclaimed coupons to 1 or more charitable or governmental organizations, as
agreed to by the parties.  The distribution and redemption of any proceeds under
this subsection shall not be used to calculate attorneys’ fees under this section.
Id.
34 Id. § 1712(b).
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(2) the court must hold a hearing to determine whether the proposed settle-
ment is “fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members.”35
CAFA also contained a “Findings and Purposes” section that was incor-
porated into the notes following § 1711.36  First, Congress found that “[o]ver
the past decade, there have been abuses of the class action device that
have . . . undermined public respect for our judicial system.”37  Further, Con-
gress found the following: “[c]lass members often receive little or no benefit
from class actions, and are sometimes harmed, such as where . . . [class]
counsel are awarded large fees, while leaving class members with coupons or
other awards of little or no value . . . .”38  Using broad language, Congress
found that these “[a]buses in class actions undermine the national judicial
system.”39
B. Senate Report 104-19: Attempting to Resolve Ambiguities
The report that accompanied CAFA shines some light on Congress’s
intent when drafting the statute.40  According to Congress, class actions
“were designed to provide a mechanism by which persons, whose injuries are
not large enough to make pursuing their individual claims in the court sys-
tem cost efficient, are able to bind together with persons suffering the same
35 Id. § 1712(e).  Whether this is redundant is an interesting point.  When class actions
that would bind class members settle, courts must already hold a hearing to determine
whether the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).  How-
ever, the answer to that inquiry is beyond the scope of this Note.




40  S. REP. NO. 109-14 (2005). The utility of this Senate report, however, in discerning
Congress’s intent has been subject to debate. See Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1617, 1619 n.11 (2006).  The report is dated
February 28, 2005, while Congress enacted the statute on February 18, 2005. Id.  Several
courts have weighed in on the issue.  The United States District Court for the Northern
District of California elaborated:
[The CAFA Senate] report is of dubious value as an interpretive aid.  It was issued
ten days after the president signed the bill into law.  There is thus no reason to
think it played any role in legislators’ interpretation of the bill, their decisions
about whether to support it or the president’s conclusion that he should sign it.
Hangarter v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., No. C 05-04558 WHA., 2006 WL 213834, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 26, 2006). But see Estate of Pew v. Cardarelli, 527 F.3d 25, 32–33 (2d Cir. 2008)
(noting that it is “appropriate” to examine the report when interpreting “particularly
knotty provisions”); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1206 n.50 (11th Cir. 2007)
(“In interpreting CAFA, courts have taken pains to discuss the fact that S. Rep. 109-14 is
dated February 28, 2005, ten days after CAFA was signed into law.  While the report was
issued ten days following CAFA’s enactment, it was submitted to the Senate on February 3,
2006—while that body was considering the bill.” (citation omitted)).  To make explicit
what is implicit, the Second and Eleventh Circuits’ analyses are predicated upon the
assumption that legislators reviewed the report before voting on CAFA.
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harm and seek redress for their injuries.”41  Class actions, it said, “are only
beneficial when the class members are kept a priority throughout the
process.”42
Turning more specifically to the coupon settlement attorneys’ fees provi-
sions, the drafters of the report noted that Congress added them “to ensure
that such fee awards are consistent with the benefits afforded class members
or the amount of real work that the class counsel have performed in connec-
tion with the litigation.”43  Thus, there were two purposes of the coupon set-
tlement provisions: (1) to ensure that the attorneys were not receiving large
sums of money while the class members themselves received worthless reme-
dies; or (2) to ensure that the class counsel were adequately compensated for
their real work.44
Congress then turned to the factual findings that served as the stimuli
for the coupon settlement provisions.  In an effort to display some of these
findings, Congress listed dozens of instances in which attorneys were awarded
exorbitant sums of money while the members of the class obtained minimal
relief.45  The report juxtaposed the non-monetary relief obtained by the class
members to the cash received by attorneys,46 presumably to convey that the
lawyers were the real beneficiaries of the litigation.
Speaking more broadly about the purpose of the statute, § 1712, the
report said, “is aimed at situations in which plaintiffs’ lawyers negotiate settle-
ments under which class members receive nothing but essentially valueless
coupons, while the class counsel receive substantial attorneys’ fees.”47  The
report further elaborated on concerns implicated by such a situation, label-
ing it as an “inequit[y].”48
So, one thing is clear: Congress evinced an intention to stop practices by
which attorneys make a huge profit while clients obtain a relatively worthless
41  S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4; see also, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS 68 (2000) (“[I]f [a] loss is small, it is less likely to be recognized by those
affected, and it is less likely that anyone will come forward to claim compensation even if
many individuals or businesses are affected by it.”).
42  S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4.
43 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).  Of extreme importance for our interpretive analysis
here is use of the disjunctive (“or”) instead of the conjunctive (“and”).  The purpose is not
to achieve both outcomes, but rather one or the other.
44 Presumably, this is an effort to combat the lawyers’ incentive to exponentially
increase billable hours in an effort to reap an enormous profit while expending less effort
to accomplish a desirable outcome for the class.
45  S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 15–20. But see Willging & Wheatman, supra note 12, at
651–52. For a brief discussion of the relevance of anecdotal information in our interpre-
tive analysis, see supra note 25.
46  S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 15–20.
47 Id. at 30.
48 Id.  See also In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“Indeed . . . the legislative history of CAFA clarifies [that] the attorneys’ fees provisions of
§ 1712 are intended to put an end to the ‘inequities’ that arise when class counsel receive
attorneys’ fees that are grossly disproportionate to the actual value of the coupon relief
obtained for the class.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 29–32)).
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recovery.  The rationale underlying such an intention is relatively straightfor-
ward: fundamental notions of fairness.  If attorneys are supposed to serve
their clients, allowing them to receive exorbitant fees while the clients receive
virtually nothing is unfair.  The possibility of collusion between the attorney
and the defendants exacerbates that fear.
This relatively broad purpose raises the following question: Did Con-
gress intend to abandon the lodestar method entirely when calculating the
attorneys’ fees in settlements involving the distribution of coupons to con-
sumers?  Such a solution does not seem unreasonable given the broader pur-
pose of the statute.  If you prohibit lawyers from using the lodestar method,
attorneys likely will not drive up costs at the expense of their clients; their
earnings will be based upon a contingency fee calculated as a percentage of
the coupons redeemed by the class.
On the other hand, there may be situations in which attorneys will be
overcompensated or undercompensated for their work.  The theory that peo-
ple should be adequately compensated for their work is deeply rooted in
Anglo-American law.49  The Third Circuit, in Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.50—where, as one scholar
remarked, the lodestar method was perhaps “best articulated”51—posited,
“[i]n detailing the standards that should guide the award of fees to attorneys
successfully concluding class suits, by judgment or settlement, we must start
from the purpose of the award: to compensate the attorney for the reasonable
value of services benefitting the unrepresented claimant.”52
Seeking to balance these competing interests, Congress seemed not to
completely preclude the lodestar method of calculating attorneys’ fees—
although we will see that it did so in opaque language.
First—and most importantly—Congress explicitly contemplated situa-
tions in which parties to a class action coupon settlement could calculate
attorneys’ fees on a lodestar basis.53  The report expounded upon CAFA as
follows:
In some cases, the proponents of a class settlement involving coupons
may decline to propose that attorney’s fees be based on the value of the
coupon-based relief provided by the settlement.  Instead, the settlement pro-
ponents may propose that counsel fees be based upon the amount of time
class counsel reasonably expended working on the action.  Section 1712(b)
confirms the appropriateness of determining attorneys’ fees on this basis in
connection with a settlement based in part on coupon relief.  As is stated on
49 Cf. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287–88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (“The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we
may say, are properly his.”).
50 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
51  WILLGING & WEEKS, supra note 4, at 31.
52 Lindy Bros., 487 F.2d at 167 (emphasis added).  Notice, however, that the excerpt
does not focus solely on compensating attorneys for their labor.  Instead, the court ties in
benefits to the claimant(s).
53  S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 30 (clarifying that § 1217(b) allows such a scenario).
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its face, nothing in this section should be construed to prohibit using the
“lodestar with multiplier” method of calculating attorney’s fees.54
This provision attempts to clarify the ambiguity in CAFA.  Based on this
excerpt, parties have the opportunity to bargain for whatever method of cal-
culating attorneys’ fees that they choose.  By saying that the parties may rec-
ommend that “counsel fees be based upon the amount of time class counsel
reasonably expended working on the action,” Congress indeed embraced the
lodestar method.55  Use of a contingent fee, according to this part of the
report, is discretionary rather than mandatory.
But there are some snippets of the report where Congress was unclear.
First, this option to use the lodestar method seems antithetical to the broad
purpose of the statute to end the practice of attorneys receiving exorbitant
fees at the expense of their clients.  Mandating a contingency fee would seem
to effectuate that purpose.  Making it discretionary, on the other hand, seems
to be “all bark” without any bite.  Lawyers will still have the incentive to
ratchet up their fees.
Second, the report contains language that can be construed to back
away from the discretionary approach to calculating attorneys’ fees and
instead mandate that the fees be calculated on a contingency basis.  While
elaborating on § 1712(c), the report said, “[i]f the plaintiffs’ attorneys secure
a mixed award, i.e. coupons and an injunction, then part of their fee will be
based on the coupons redeemed and part will be based on the reasonable
expenditure of time.”56  This cryptic language suggests that the fee should be
based on a contingency basis for work that resulted in coupon relief.  The
lodestar method would be more appropriate for work expended in the pur-
suit of injunctive relief.
Such was the legal landscape at the time of the enactment of CAFA.  The
courts were then left to interpret its ambiguous provisions.
III. INTERPRETING THE STATUTE: CIRCUIT SPLITS AND METHODS OF
INTERPRETATION
A. The Ninth Circuit Approach
1. The Settlement and Procedural History
In 2013, the Ninth Circuit weighed in on attorneys’ fees in coupon set-
tlements in In re HP Inkjet Litigation.57  The facts of the case are relatively
straightforward.  The case was an aggregation of three individual class
actions, all involving the broad doctrine of “unfair business practices.”58
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 91–92.
57 716 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2013).
58 Id. at 1176.  In the first action, plaintiffs alleged that HP misled consumers into
unnecessarily replacing their ink cartridges, depriving them of additional printing. Id. n.1.
The second action alleged that HP failed to disclose that its colored printers printed black
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After broad and “aggressive[ ]” discovery, the parties entered into a global
settlement.59  The terms of the settlement were as follows:
In exchange for the plaintiffs’ release of all claims against it, HP agreed to:
(1) provide eligible class members with up to $5 million in “e-credits”
redeemable for printers and printer supplies on HP’s website; (2) make
additional disclosures on its website, in its user manuals, or in its software
interfaces to explain its business practices to future purchasers of HP print-
ers and ink; (3) pay up to $950,000 for class notice and settlement adminis-
tration costs; and (4) pay up to $2,900,000 in attorneys’ fees and expenses.
The “e-credits”—a euphemism for coupons—expire six months after issu-
ance, are non-transferable, and cannot be used with other discounts or
coupons.60
The class counsel filed over seven million dollars in fees and expenses.61
The district court opined that the plaintiffs’ claims were not strong.62  After
the parties to the lawsuit negotiated a settlement deal, the district court held
a fairness hearing to determine whether the settlement was “fair, reasonable,
and adequate” pursuant to Rule 23(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.63
The district court then issued a separate ruling on the reasonableness of
the attorneys’ fees being sought by the class counsel.  The lodestar method,
according to the district court, is allowable under § 1712(b)(1) of CAFA.64
According to the court, what is “reasonable” should be read in light of the
benefits conferred on the class.65
2. Majority Opinion
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit confronted the question whether the
award of attorneys’ fees violated CAFA because they were calculated using
the lodestar method instead of a contingency fee.66  The court began its dis-
cussion by referencing CAFA’s legislative purpose.  According to the court,
CAFA was passed “primarily to curb perceived abuses of the class action
device.”67  It was very clear from the beginning of the opinion that this pur-
and white images with colored ink. Id.  Finally, the third action alleged that HP concealed
the fact that its ink cartridges actually had an expiration date and were thus incapable of
printing after said date. Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1177.
62 Id. at 1176–77.
63  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
64 HP Inkjet, 716 F.3d at 1177.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1178 (“Our sole task on this appeal is to interpret and apply the attorneys’ fees
provisions of § 1712.”).
67 Id. at 1177 (quoting Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 2009)).
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pose was used as a broad interpretive tool for the court as it progressed
through its analysis.68
The court then began its interpretation of the statute.  The first step in
its analysis was to determine whether the statutory text is clear.  If so, then the
analysis was over.  If not, however, the court would have to turn to use other
interpretive tools to answer the issue presented in the case.69  The court pos-
ited that the language is not clear and that it would have to employ different
modalities of interpretation to ascertain Congress’s true legislative intent.70
The court then interpreted the text of § 1712(a)71—the provision con-
cerning contingency fees.  Specifically, the court sought to define the phrase
“attributable to.”  After citing multiple dictionary definitions, the court
arrived on the following construction: “[A]ttorneys’ fees are ‘attributable to’
an award of coupons where ‘the [singular] award of the coupons’ is the con-
dition precedent to the award of attorneys’ fees.”72  Combining this interpre-
tation of “attributable to” with the mandatory connotations of the word
“shall,” the court arrived at the following proposition: if attorneys’ work
results in coupon relief, then the attorneys’ fees shall be calculated using a
contingency fee.73
This argument is predicated on an important assumption: attorneys’ fees
should be calculated according to the relief obtained by the class, not just the
amount of work expended.  To this end, the court elaborated: “An attorney
who works incredibly hard, but obtains nothing for the class, is not entitled to
68 Id. at 1179 (noting that the purpose of the statute “cannot be overemphasized”).
Whether the use of legislative history or “legislative intent” is a useful tool for interpreting
a statute is a question that has been “a classic subject of debate.” NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D.
SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:6, at 41 (7th ed. 2007).
Scholars say that the intent of the legislature is the “most often recited” criterion for ascer-
taining the statute’s meaning. Id. § 45:5, at 28.  These scholars opine: “It has also been
stated to show that all rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that legisla-
tive intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used and that
language must be construed in the light of the intended purpose.” Id. § 45:5, at 36.  Not
all courts and commentators view legislative history as an effective tool, however. See, e.g.,
FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 30 (2009) (not-
ing that textualists believe that the effort to accurately discern legislative intent is “mean-
ingless” and “incoherent”); id. at 61 (“Even when the legislative intent may be discerned, as
a theoretical manner, some question the ability of the judiciary to do so.”); JOSEPH L. GER-
KEN, WHAT GOOD IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY? 1 (2007) (noting that Justice Scalia rejected
using legislative history as an interpretive tool because it can “mislead[ ]” and be “unrelia-
ble” to judges).  Further, there are inherent difficulties in accurately identifying what a
multimember body—such as Congress—intended. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text,
History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994)
(“Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a collective body.”).
69 HP Inkjet, 716 F.3d at 1180–81.
70 Id. at 1181.
71 See supra note 30.
72 HP Inkjet, 716 F.3d at 1181 (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a)
(2012)).
73 Id. at 1182–83.
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fees calculated by any method. . . . Plaintiffs attorneys don’t get paid simply
for working; they get paid for obtaining results.”74
Still, § 1712(a) does not exist in a vacuum; the court then had to recon-
cile it with other provisions in the statute to make the statute function as a
whole.  The court held that “§ 1712(b) applies in situations where a coupon
settlement also provides for non-coupon relief, such as equitable or injunc-
tive relief.”75
To get to this result, the court used § 1712(a) as its anchor.  The entire
statute was to be read in harmony with the mandate contained in Section A.
The logic of the court is as follows: § 1712(a) requires that any attorneys’ fee
award that results in coupon relief must be calculated using the lodestar
method.  Section 1712(b) says that if the contingency fee is not used, then
the fee must be calculated using the lodestar method.  Since the contingency
fee is always used for coupons, the only time you can use the lodestar method
is when the settlement provides for injunctive relief in addition to coupon
relief.76
Finally, the court held that § 1712(c)’s function is to provide a simple
formula the courts will use to get the final number of attorneys’ fees.  As the
court posited, “the total amount of fees awarded under subsection (c) will be
the sum of the amounts calculated under subsections (a) and (b).”77  That is
the lone function of that subsection.
3. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Berzon’s dissenting opinion is important for several reasons.  First,
as with any dissent, it provides compelling legal arguments to counter the
majority’s analysis.  It was also referenced in the Seventh Circuit opinion.
Judge Berzon began her dissent by positing that the majority’s interpre-
tation of the statute runs counter to “what the statute says.”78  According to
Judge Berzon, the statute allows the parties to choose what method to employ
when calculating the fees.79
Beginning her rigorous textual analysis, Judge Berzon pointed out that
all of § 1712, since it is entitled “Coupon settlements,” refers to coupon set-
tlements, regardless of whether they comprise the entire relief award.80  She
provided dictionary definitions of nearly every word in the statute, particu-
larly from Black’s Law Dictionary.  “[A]ttributable to” for Judge Berzon sim-
ply supplied the connection between the value of attorneys’ fees and the
value of coupons, leading her to conclude that § 1712(a) “is concerned with
74 Id. at 1182.
75 Id. at 1183.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1185.
78 Id. at 1187 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 1191 (“[T]he provisions permit two methods—not one—of calculating attor-
ney’s fees in cases involving coupon settlements: the percentage-of-recovery method . . .
and the lodestar, payment-for-reasonable-time-worked method . . . .”).
80 Id. at 1192 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012)).
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those situations in which the value of fees, in whole or in part, is derived from
the value of the coupons provided.”81  She also cited snippets of legislative
history.82
Section 1712(a), then, functioned very differently for Judge Berzon than
for the majority.  Her interpretation was that if the parties elect to award
attorneys’ fees on a contingency basis, then those awards are to be calculated
using the value of the coupons actually redeemed by the class.  At the end of
the day, the choice to employ a contingency fee or the lodestar method
remained entirely up to the parties.  Conversely, the majority asserted that if
the attorneys’ work resulted in coupon relief, then the court must use a con-
tingency fee—and only a contingency fee.
Turning to § 1712(b), Judge Berzon noted that the subsection governed
“other” attorneys’ fees—in this instance, using the lodestar method—“in cou-
pon settlements,” countering the majority’s assertion that subsection (b)
applied only to equitable relief obtained for the class.83  The fact that Judge
Berzon interpreted all of § 1712 to apply to coupon settlements factored
heavily into her analysis.84  If subsection (b) applies in instances in which
coupons are the only relief obtained, it would not be logical to follow the
majority’s approach, which applied subsection (b) in cases where there is
equitable relief.
Judge Berzon concluded that § 1712(c) applies to situations where the
methods of calculating attorneys’ fees are mixed (i.e., when the court uses a
contingency fee and the lodestar method) instead of when the relief is mixed
(i.e., coupon and injunctive relief).85
Finally, Judge Berzon included excerpts from the Senate Report accom-
panying CAFA to bolster her argument, both of which were referenced ear-
lier.86  These excerpts indicate that Congress’s intent was not as sweeping as
the majority would suggest.  Congress wanted to accord courts adequate dis-
cretion to compensate attorneys appropriately on a case-by-case basis.87
B. The Seventh Circuit Approach
Two years after the Ninth Circuit’s decision, in In re Southwest Airlines
Voucher Litigation,88 the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion that ran counter to
the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute.
81 Id. at 1194.
82 Id. (positing that the legislative history invoked by the majority actually supports her
argument).
83 Id. at 1195 (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1712(b)).
84 Id. at 1195–96.
85 Id. at 1196 (“[W]hat is mixed in instances covered by § 1712(c) is the method for
calculating fees . . . .”).
86 Id. at 1198–99; supra text accompanying notes 43, 54.
87 See HP Inkjet, 716 F.3d at 1198–99 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
88 799 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2015).
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1. The Settlement and Procedural History
The litigation at issue arose out of drink vouchers distributed by South-
west Airlines.  The company issued these vouchers—good for a “free in-flight
alcoholic drink”—to passengers who purchased certain tickets with the air-
line.89  These vouchers contained no expiration date and were honored for
some time.  However, in August of 2010, Southwest stopped honoring
them.90  Two plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit, and the parties quickly
settled.  The terms of the settlement were as follows:
First, it requires Southwest to issue replacement coupons to each class mem-
ber who files a claim form.  The coupons are transferable and good for one
year on any Southwest flight.  Second, the settlement provides injunctive
relief to prevent similar controversies over expiration dates if Southwest
issues new coupons in the future.  Third, the settlement provides for incen-
tive awards to the two lead plaintiffs of $15,000 each.91
In addition, Southwest agreed to pay the attorneys up to three million
dollars and thirty thousand dollars worth of expenses.92
The district court approved the settlement and opined that it provided
virtually complete relief to the class.93  The district court also determined
that the use of the lodestar method for this coupon settlement94 was permis-
sible under § 1712, and finally settled on attorneys’ fees totaling
$1,649,118.95
2. Opinion
The court then undertook to determine whether § 1712(a) precludes
the use of the lodestar method when calculating attorneys’ fees in a settle-
ment that provides for coupons.
First, the court opined that the language of the statute was the starting
point for its analysis.  Examining the language of § 1712(a), it drew one ini-
tial conclusion: the statute precludes the parties from making a contingency
fee a percentage of the coupons made available to the class, as this was,
according to the court, the “most abusive method for calculating a fee in a
coupon settlement.”96
Instead of mandating that courts use a contingency calculation when
coupons are obtained, the court made the following conclusion: “[I]f any
portion of the fee is attributed to the coupon benefits, then that portion of
89 Id. at 704.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 705.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Again, because the term “coupon” has been given a broader definition, these vouch-
ers qualified as coupons.
95 Sw. Airlines, 799 F.3d at 705.
96 Id. at 708.
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the fee must be based on the coupons used.”97  Directly after asserting that,
however, the court conceded that § 1712(a) is ambiguous when read in isola-
tion.  Only upon considering the subsection within the broader statutory
scheme can one truly discern its meaning.98  According to the court, it is
difficult to reconcile § 1712(b) and (c) with the Ninth Circuit’s interpreta-
tion of subsection (a).
Moving to subsection (b)(1), the court posited that it “contemplates and
allows the possibility that ‘a portion of the recovery of the coupons’ will not
be used to determine the fee for class counsel, and that instead the lodestar
method will be used.”99  The language simply allows parties to employ the
lodestar method when calculating attorneys’ fees.
Turning then to subsection (c), the court invoked the “canon against
surplusage,” which is a canon of statutory interpretation that assumes legisla-
tors do not enact two provisions of the same section or subsection of a statute
that are superfluous.100  The unique role each subsection plays in the statute
are as follows:
Subsection (a) prohibits basing a percentage-of-recovery fee on the face
value of all coupons made available.  Subsection (b) says that lodestar is the
only permissible alternative to percentage-of-coupons-used.  And subsection
(c) allows, though does not require, a blend of the two methods when a
coupon settlement also provides some equitable or cash relief.101
IV. EVALUATING THE LEGAL REASONING EMPLOYED IN THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
First—and most importantly—the language of the statute, when read as
a whole, is relatively clear.  The most important rule of statutory construction
is to read the statute according to its plain meaning.102  Read in a vacuum,
97 Id.
98 Id. at 708–09 (“The meaning of subsection (a) becomes clearer, however, when we
look at how it fits together with the other fee provisions in subsections (b) and (c). . . . In
context, the meaning of subsection (a) becomes clearer and the Ninth Circuit’s reading
becomes less persuasive.”).
99 Id. at 709 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1712(b)(1) (2012)).
100 Id. at 710.
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GEN-
ERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 2 (2008) (“The starting point in statutory construc-
tion is the language of the statute itself.  The Supreme Court often recites the ‘plain
meaning rule,’ that, if the language of the statute is clear, there is no need to look outside
the statute to its legislative history in order to ascertain the statute’s meaning. . . . More
often than before, statutory text is the ending point as well as the starting point for inter-
pretation.”); Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1971, 1972 (2007) (“The most obvious interpretive method, typically consid-
ered the beginning of the analysis, relies on the words of the text itself.  Some argue that
reliance on the text should also serve as the end of the analysis . . . .”).  Judge Friendly, a
long-time judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, wrote that
former Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter claimed that there are three “imperatives”
of statutory interpretation: “(1) Read the statute; (2) read the statute; (3) read the statute!”
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL510.txt unknown Seq: 18 30-AUG-16 10:57
2108 notre dame law review [vol. 91:5
§ 1712(a) can be interpreted according to the Ninth Circuit’s approach.  If
coupons are the relief obtained, any attorneys’ fee award attributable to the
award of coupons shall be calculated according to a contingency fee.
However, the statutory scheme must factor into the analysis; after all,
§ 1712(a) does not exist in a vacuum.  Section 1712(b), entitled “Other
Attorney’s Fee Awards in Coupon Settlements,” provides:
If a proposed settlement in a class action provides for a recovery of coupons
to class members, and a portion of the recovery of the coupons [i.e., a con-
tingency fee] is not used to determine the attorney’s fee . . . any attorney’s
fee award shall be based upon the amount of time class counsel reasonably
expended working on the action.103
This section of the statute conveys—albeit convolutedly—that if (1) cou-
pons are the relief obtained, and (2) a contingency fee is not used, then the
parties are accorded the autonomy to calculate attorneys’ fees based upon
the lodestar method.
Further, the canon against surplusage supports the Seventh Circuit’s
approach.  In support of its argument, the Ninth Circuit opined that it
“must . . . mak[e] every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that
renders other provisions of the same statute . . . superfluous.”104  Interest-
ingly, that reasoning supports the Seventh Circuit’s approach.  Think about it
this way: if § 1712(a) governs the award of attorneys’ fees and § 1712(b) is
the regime for injunctive relief, § 1712(c) serves no function.105  That sec-
tion governs “Attorney’s Fee Awards Calculated on a Mixed Basis in Coupon
Settlements,” which would already be governed under the Ninth Circuit’s
approach to § 1712(b).  If we assume that legislators are sophisticated
enough actors to give every section and subsection a function—especially in
the same section—then the Ninth Circuit’s approach is untenable.  Textually
and structurally speaking, the Seventh Circuit has the better approach.
Assuming arguendo that the court must draw on other interpretive rules
to ascertain Congress’s intent, reliance on legislative history yields the same
result.  The Senate report clearly contemplated a choice between the lode-
star method and a contingency fee by (1) claiming that the purpose of the
statute was to “ensure that such fee awards are consistent with the benefits
HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 202 (1967). But see, e.g.,id. (“There are times when adher-
ence to [Frankfurter’s] rule can be not only the first step in the interpretive process but
the last.  However, this will not usually be so.”).
103 28 U.S.C. § 1712(b)(1).
104 In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d 1173, 1184 (9th Cir. 2013) (alteration in
original) (quoting Boise Cascade Corp. v. EPA, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991)).  In
response, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that the Ninth Circuit failed to take § 1712(a)’s
prohibition on calculating fees according to the face value of the coupons into considera-
tion. Sw. Airlines, 799 F.3d at 710 n.2.  This gives the subsection a function.  For a discus-
sion on the canon against surplusage, see Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1178
(2013); id. at 1181–82 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
105 This was echoed by the Seventh Circuit. Sw. Airlines, 799 F.3d at 710 (“One basic
tool in statutory interpretation is the canon against surplusage. . . . Under [the Ninth
Circuit’s approach], subsection (c) seems to become surplusage.”).
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afforded class members or the amount of real work that the class counsel
have performed,”106 and (2) explicitly describing a scenario where the par-
ties have the discretion to choose.107  Both the Seventh Circuit and Judge
Berzon used at least one of these snippets of legislative history to bolster their
arguments.108
V.  PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT DOCTRINE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
IMPROVEMENT
As discussed, the Seventh Circuit’s approach is sounder under principles
of statutory interpretation.109  The text—when interpreted in harmony with
the entirety of the statute—and legislative history both support its outcome.
When given this reading, however, the coupon settlement provisions of
CAFA are underinclusive.  In other words, CAFA does not regulate enough of
the problems presented by coupon settlements.110  Congress identified prob-
lematic incentive structures (attorneys having the incentive to collect exorbi-
tant fees, often at the expense of clients) and sought to remedy that problem
by allowing that conduct at the discretion of the parties.111  Congress should
amend CAFA to adequately address the flawed incentive structures.
Before proceeding with a solution, there are several concerns with the
current scenario that cut in favor of amending CAFA.  First—as is the case
with all circuit splits—this circuit split creates and perpetuates uncertainty.
Parties to the litigation must bargain in the midst of uncertainty and have to
essentially guess what reading of the statute courts will apply.  Further, courts
are left without clear and coherent interpretive rules to apply in a given situa-
tion.  Even though the Seventh Circuit arrived at the opposite conclusion of
the Ninth Circuit, it found the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation reasonable.112
106  S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005) (emphasis added).
107 Id. at 30 (noting that parties may decline to propose a contingency fee).
108 Sw. Airlines, 799 F.3d at 709 (invoking the report language that explicitly contem-
plates the discretion to choose); HP Inkjet, 716 F.3d at 1198 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (noting
the report’s use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive); id. at 1199 (also invoking
the report language that explicitly contemplates the discretion to choose).
109 See supra Part IV.
110 This is not to say, however, that CAFA was entirely ineffective.  For example,
§ 1712(a) says that if the settlement does include a contingency fee, such a fee must be
calculated as a percentage of the coupons actually redeemed rather than simply made availa-
ble to the entire class.  28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2012).  That provision incentivizes an attorney
to obtain coupons clients will actually redeem.  This, to some extent, does achieve the
statute’s stated purpose to compensate attorneys in correlation to the benefits received by
the class.
111 Id. § 1712(b)(1) (“If a . . . settlement . . . provides for a recovery of coupons . . . and
a portion of the recovery of the coupons is not used to determine the attorney’s fee . . . any
attorney’s fee award shall be based upon the amount of time . . . reasonably
expended . . . .”).
112 In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 708 (7th Cir. 2015) (“It can be fairly
read as the HP Inkjet majority read it, but that is not the only possibility.”).  It remains
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It will be difficult for courts to expound upon a statute that is susceptible to
two reasonable interpretations.
Second, the incentive structures inherent in coupon settlements are
problematic when viewed in light of the attorney’s role in the adversarial
system.  In our system, the attorney has a duty to zealously advocate for his
client.113  Several scholars have opined that, more generally, class actions
alter these incentives and create troubling concerns.114  Certainly, coupon
settlements go a step further to misalign attorney-client incentives.  It is diffi-
cult for an attorney to adequately represent his client’s interests when those
interests may be deliberately in conflict with his own.
Third, several scholars have questioned the adequacy of coupons in
redressing plaintiffs’ grievances.115  Scholars posit that defendants use cou-
pons in a way that confers as little of a benefit as possible to plaintiffs (e.g., by
imposing non-transferability restrictions and expiration dates).116  Certain
scholars go even further and claim that coupons are actually business oppor-
tunities for companies.117  This seems antithetical to the American system of
remedies, which generally views compensatory damages as a means to make
plaintiffs whole after suffering an injury at the hands of defendants.118  If
unclear what interpretive regime—the Seventh Circuit or the Ninth Circuit—will rule the
day.
113 See, e.g., In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962) (“[A] vigorous, independent bar
[is an] indispensable part[ ] of our system of justice.”); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, AM. BAR ASS’N
SECTION OF LITIG., READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDI-
CATION 179 (1988) (“Zeal and confidentiality have come to be seen as the hallmarks of the
adversarial advocate’s duty to his client.”); FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERME-
NEUTICS 91 (1839) (“[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in
all the world, and that person is his client.  To save that client by all means and expedients,
and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and among them, to himself, is his first and
only duty . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting 2 A FULL REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF HER MAJESTY
CAROLINE AMELIA ELIZABETH, QUEEN OF ENGLAND, BEFORE THE PEERS OF GREAT BRITAIN
1194 (1820) (statement of Lord Brougham))); PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF LAWYERS 266–68
(Dennis Campbell & Christian T. Campbell eds., 1995) (discussing various duties lawyers
owe their clients).
114 See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1593, 1596–1602 (2008) (summarizing critiques of lawyers’ roles in class actions); Steven B.
Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor’s Clothes of Class Actions,18 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343, 1343 (2005) (“[C]lass actions can provide incentives that pervert the
civil justice system . . . .”); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82
VA. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (1996)(characterizing current practices as “[l]awyer self-dealing on
a grand scale”); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class
Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439, 441 (1996) (noting that current legal
mechanisms are “not effective” for class members when defendants insist that the class
should be certified only for settlement).
115 See supra note 18.
116 For a more thorough discussion of coupons and their pros and cons, see supra text
accompanying notes 16–25.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 16–25.
118 Douglas Laycock described this basic remedial purpose as the “rightful position”
principle. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 14–15 (4th ed. 2010).  Specifi-
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coupons are more of a business opportunity for defendants, encouraging
their use may lead to windfalls.119
Fourth, clients who have been aggrieved by these practices still suffer
harm.  Some scholars argue that empirical evidence suggests that these
harms are overstated.120  That argument certainly carries weight given its reli-
ance on empirical data, but it does not capture the entire picture.  An
injury’s infrequency does not necessarily render it insignificant; it does not
detract from the fact that an injury is still being suffered.
Keeping these concerns in mind, this Part will propose a solution.  As
mentioned earlier, coupon settlements implicate two competing interests.
First, any reform should attempt to align as closely as possible the incentives
of the class and those of class counsel.  As one scholar remarked, “courts
should not award fees larger than the amounts which are required to fulfill
[their] purpose.”121  At the same time, however, the question of attorneys’
compensation lurks in the background.  Any statute that alters the existing
law should generally ensure that attorneys are adequately compensated for
their labor.  Any legislation should keep in mind these competing interests
and accommodate them as much as possible.
In light of these considerations, Congress should amend CAFA to create
a statutory presumption that attorneys will be compensated by a contingency
fee for all of their efforts that contribute to coupons, both transferrable and
non-transferrable.  The contingency fee—like § 1712(a) prescribes—will be
calculated as an agreed-upon percentage of the coupons actually redeemed as
opposed to simply made available to the class.  This definition of “coupons”
cally, the rightful position principle is “the position [the plaintiff] rightfully would have
come to but for defendant’s wrong.” Id. at 15.  Justice Sotomayor claimed that compensa-
tory damages “shall be the result of the injury alleged and proved, and that the amount
awarded shall be precisely commensurate with the injury suffered.”  FAA v. Cooper, 132 S.
Ct. 1441, 1457–58 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S.
64, 64 (1876)); see also, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 263 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he purpose of compensatory damages is to compensate
victims.”); Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 245 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring) (“[T]raditional compensatory damages are assessed to make the individual
victim whole . . . .”).
119 Again, this Note does not take a position on the desirability of coupon relief.  As
noted earlier, there are benefits to coupons, such as allowing companies to remain solvent.
See Mezzetti & Case, supra note 18, at 1433–34. Supporters of coupon settlements claim
that it is a win-win situation to grant relief to plaintiffs while simultaneously keeping a
company solvent.  Because of its institutional competence and democratic nature, Con-
gress alone can—and should—determine coupons’ remedial role.  The assumption here,
of course, is that the prerogative to change this lies with Congress.  For a discussion of the
rationale underlying this assumption, see Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533 (1947) (“[Courts] are under the constraints imposed
by the judicial function in our democratic society. . . . [T]he function in construing a
statute is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the legislature.  To go beyond it is to
usurp a power which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature.”).
120 See supra text accompanying notes 20–24.
121 Developments in the Law: Class Actions, supra note 17, at 1611.
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would also be more capacious to encompass vouchers.  In circumstances in
which it would be unreasonable to compensate attorneys accordingly, how-
ever, the court may award attorneys’ fees using the lodestar method.
There are two circumstances where the lodestar method may be war-
ranted: (1) when the contingency fee award is significantly greater than the
fee calculated by the lodestar method, resulting in a windfall for the plain-
tiff’s attorney;122 and (2) when the lodestar method is sufficiently greater
than the contingency fee that it would be manifestly unjust to compensate
the attorney according to the contingency fee.  The former situation prevents
class counsel from receiving a windfall.  On the other end of the spectrum,
the latter prevents the attorneys from being grossly undercompensated in
certain situations.123  The burdens to overcome the statutory presumption,
however, should be high.  Indeed, if they were not, the proposal would be
virtually indistinguishable from the current situation, where parties have the
autonomy to choose either the lodestar method or a contingency fee.  The
exception should not swallow the rule.
Finally, attorneys should not be able to recover more than the class itself.
This idea is not novel, as courts have effectuated it.124  Such a rule allows
class action proceedings to be client-centered.
This scenario accommodates both interests.  It provides several mecha-
nisms to tie the incentive structures of class counsel to those of the class.  For
example, the statutory presumption of a contingency fee would motivate
attorneys to negotiate for the best deal possible for clients.  The larger the
coupon award—and remember, the amount actually redeemed as opposed to
merely made available—the higher the compensation for the attorney.  Intui-
tively, the provision prohibiting attorneys from collecting more fees than the
value to clients further protects the members of the class.
These provisions also allow exceptions where the lodestar method may
be employed, a recognition that there may be instances in which it is prefera-
122 This carve-out adequately responds to concerns voiced by Judge Berzon in her dis-
sent in In re HP Inkjet Printer Litigation, 716 F.3d 1173, 1197 (9th Cir. 2013) (Berzon, J.,
dissenting) (“Under the majority’s interpretation, for example, if a coupon settlement
were reached after plaintiffs’ attorneys did very little work, the attorneys would nonetheless
be statutorily entitled to receive a fee equivalent to up to the benchmark twenty-five per-
cent of the value of the redeemed coupons, instead of a lodestar fee based on hours
worked, which could amount to much less.  For all the reasons already surveyed, Congress
did not intend such unreasonable results . . . .”).
123 Imagine, for example, an attorney who expends significant hours defending his cli-
ent, encountering complex issues of fact and law.  However, a contingency fee rate grossly
undercompensates him for his work.  Such a scenario may warrant the lodestar method.
However, this would only apply in extraordinary circumstances.  The Ninth Circuit had a
point when it opined that “[a]n attorney who works incredibly hard, but obtains nothing
for the class, is not entitled to fees calculated by any method.” Id. at 1182 (majority
opinion).
124 See id. at 1177 (noting that the district court, in reducing the initial award of attor-
neys’ fees, recognized that it would be “improper to award fees that outstrip the calculated
class benefit”).
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ble.  This choice seeks to link the award of fees to the hours worked rather
than the amount of the coupons.  These provisions would avoid a scenario
that would either grossly undercompensate or overcompensate attorneys.
Keep in mind, however, that the bar to rebut the statutory presumption is
high.
CONCLUSION
Given the significance of the policy implications presented by coupon
settlements—especially when considered in tandem with the attorney’s role
in the adversarial system—Congress should amend CAFA.  Doing so would
provide courts with clear guidance as they adjudicate disputes in a precarious
legal landscape.
To that end, Congress should adopt a statutory presumption that attor-
neys must be compensated on a contingency fee basis when their work yields
a coupon settlement.  This is an attempt to properly align the incentives of
the class counsel to adequately represent the interests of the class.  If the
attorneys do well for their clients, they will be compensated accordingly.
Still, there may be circumstances where this regime leads to equally
unfavorable outcomes.  What happens when a contingency fee yields a wind-
fall for the attorneys?  If defendants are incentivized to distribute coupons for
relief, they may be quick to do so to avoid the arduous burden of litigation
against class actions.  Accordingly, there should be a mechanism for judges to
award fees based on the lodestar method when it is appropriate to do so.
However, this calculation should not be awarded liberally.
Such a solution more closely aligns the incentive structures inherent in
coupon settlements.  As Congress found, “[c]lass members often receive little
or no benefit from class actions, and are sometimes harmed, such as
where . . . counsel are awarded large fees, while leaving class members with
coupons or other awards of little or no value.”125  Congress certainly wanted
to remedy these harms but enacted a statute that was ill equipped to do so.
This solution would give Congress’s bark the requisite bite.
125 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2012) (Findings and Purposes).
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